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ABSTRACT 
The Guided Missile Frigate (FFG} program evolved in an 
era of increased concern about the acquisition of weapons 
systems by both the executive and legislative branches of 
government. This thesis outlines the major studies that 
were an cutgrowth of the concern and identifies one crucial 
problem as test and evaluation~ particularily operational 
test and evaluation. This thesis follows the requirements 
of the test and evaluation directives that were promulgated 
during the evolution of the FFG program. 
A Combat System Land-Based Test Site was constructed as 
a part of the Guided Missile Frigate program. The combat 
System Test Site has been through Initial Operational Test 
and Evaluation. The requirement for operational test and 
evaluation affects significantly the test site's original 
objective of system development and integration. This 
lesson and other lessons learned at the Combat System Test 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL 
The Guided Missile Frigate (FFG 7 Class - formerly Patrol 
Frigate (PF 109 Class)) was born in an era of increased 
concern about the acquisition of weapon systems by both the 
executive and legislative branches of government. 
A comparison of the dates of some of the key events in 
the early life of the Guided Missile Frigate program with 
the dates of major studies of the acquisition of weapon 
systems provides an insight into the environment surrounding 
the program. 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) initiated a series of 
design feasibility studies in September 1970 to examine a 
new class or classes of ships to counter the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW}, Anti-Air iarfare (AAW) and Surface Warfare 
threats. The Report to The President and the Secretary of 
Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel was submitted in July 1970. 
CNO approved proceeding into the Patrol Frigate 
conceptual phase in order to explore PF mission and design 
assumptions in more detail in January 1971. Department of 
Defense Directive 5000.1 (DODD 5000.1), Acquisition of 
Major Defense Systems, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense 
David Packard was issued in July 1971. 
In September 1972 the Patrol Frigate Program passed the 
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council I/II (DSARC I/II) 
milestone. The Congressional Commission's Report of the 
Commission en Government Procurement was issued in December 
1972. 
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The Guided Missile Frigate passed the DSARC III milestone 
in November 1975. The report of the Navy and 
Acquisiticn Review Committee (NMARC) was 
secretary of the Navy in January 1975. 
Marine Corps 
made to the 
One theme, among several, that can be followed through 
all the above major documents is test and evaluation. The 
Guided Missile Frigate program is structured specifically to 
comply with DODD 5000.1 which establishes policy (including 
test and evaluation policy) for weapon systems acquisition 
program management. Rear Admiral N. Sonenshein,USN, 
commander Naval Ship Systems Command at the Patrol Frigate 
Presolicitation Conference in November 1971 stated "Our 
procurement strategy is •••• to invest heavily in land-based 
test and evaluation •••• Award of the first block of 24 
ships •••• is predicated on our being able to demonstrate 
viability of ship engineering in the propulsion and combat 
systems through operational land-based test sites." 
B. LAND-BASED TEST SITES 
A major inovation in test and evaluation and component 
integration for shipboard systems in recent years has been 
the use of land-based test sites (LBTS) • 
The objectives of the Guided Missile Frigate LBTS as 
presented to the DSARC I/II review are to validate 
installation procedures; validate system installation; 
provide configuration control; provide for evaluation of 
change proposals; and validate operation, maintenance, and 
support procedures. 
In the words of Captain Otth, Ships Ac~uisition Project 
Manager (SHAPM) for the Patrol Frigate to the DSARC I/II 
review: 
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In addition to validating the shiQ engineering aspects 
of installation and integration of tlie critical PF 
systems, the two land based test sites will provide the 
facilities to assist in the configuration management of 
the PF Propulsion and combat systems. Throughout the life 
of the PF program, these sites will be used to evaluate 
change proposals prior to application to the ships. 
Engineering solutions validatea at the sites will be 
frozen and controlled to insure that the LBTS are a 
realistic prototype of the PF combat and Propulsion 
system. 
After the initial validation of system integration the 
two land based test sites will also be used to validate 
operation, maintenance and support concepts proposed for 
the PF. 
The Deputy Secretary of 
~emorandum of 27 September 
Defense Program Decision 
1972 authorized the Navy to 
proceed with the program for development and construction of 
the PF lead ship and land-based test sites and advance 
procurement funding. But the same Decision Memorandum 
warned the Navy that approval of follow ship production 
should be contingent upon accomplishment of adequate test 
and evaluation (including Initial Operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOT&E) individually on subsystems, and 
collectively at land-based test sites) with satisfactory 
results. 
Development Concept Paper (DCP) # 97 of 3 April 1973 set 
forth the following critical test and evaluation questions 
and issues to be answered at the LBTSs: 
Does the integrated Propulsion System LBTS demonstrate 
sufficient performance and reliability to meet operational 
reguirements ? 
Is the integration of the various combat systems 
through their respective interfaces adequate! in terms of 
data transfer cnaracteristics such as hand ing ca~acity, 
rate and quality, to meet operational requirements . 
Do those operational characteristics of the integrated 
combat and propulsion systems vhich can be estimated based 
on initial operational test and evaluation, including 
reliability and maintainability show a reasonable 
probability the ship class, when afloat, will be able to 
satisfactorily accomplish the mission for which it ~as 
designed ? 
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Two Land-Based Test Sites have been constructed for the 
Guided Missile Frigate program. One was for the Combat 
system and the other for the Propulsion System. The Combat 
System Land-Based Test Site (CSLBTS) is located at the 
Sperry Systems Test Center, adjacent to Islip-MacArther 
Airport, Islip, Long Island and the Propulsion System 
Land-Based Test Site is located at the Philadelphia division 
of the Naval Ship Engineering Center, Philadelphia Naval 
Shipyard. 
The CSlBTS contains exact replicas of the ship spaces for 
the four principal compartments in which the Combat system 
is located. These are : 1) the Combat Information Center 
(CIC}, 2) the CIC and Radar Equipment Room, 3) the Mk-92 
Equipment Rocm or Forward Radar compartment, and 4) the 
separate Track Illuminating Rada~ (STIR) Equipment Room or 
Aft Radar Compartment. 
Each ccmpartment was fully outfitted with all of the 
cabling, air conditioning, 
equipment that it would have 
water, power, and ancillary 




was installed when it was required. Where 
equipment was not required, mockups were used. 
foundation, cable laying, and all other systems 
were installed in accordance with shipyard practice and were 
verified by several inspections by the shipbuilder and the 
ship design agent. 
The AN/SPS-49 Air Search Radar antenna, the Mk-92 
Combined Antenna System (CAS) , and the STIR antenna were 
installed outside the building in essentially the same 
positions relative to one another as they would be on the 
ship. 
In order to provide a complete environment for the Combat 
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system and to exercise the Combat System interfaces, 
equipment was installed to terminate every signal in the 
combat system. It was impractical to install a missile 
launcher and gun, so these elements were simulated with 
equipment which have the same interfaces and dynamic 
responses as the real items. Equipment was provided to 
simulate those ship motion inputs to the Combat System which 
come from the ship's gyrocompass and speed log. The 
missiles which would be loaded on the missile launcher were 
also simulated. This allowed the Combat System to be 
operated as a combat system in an engagement. Search, 
detection, acquisition, and simulated engagements were 
possible just as in a battle situation. 
In addition, a radar simulator was designed and built. 
The simulator provides synthetic targets on the operator's 
consoles in the same manner as if they were real targets. 
The radar simulator permits use of the remainder of the 
combat system in a complete engagement sequence when the 
radars a~e not available. Additionally, it provides the 
ability to generate engagement scenarios that are not always 
possible to duplicate with live aircraft because of 
surrounding terrain and airspace restrictions. Also a 
simulator scenario can be identically repeated which 
provides better control for test result comparisions. 
The Combat System Land-Based Test Site has been through 
two phases of Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and two 
phases of IOT&E (Phase I of DT&E and IOT&E was before the 
installation of the AN/SPS-49 Radar and Phase II of DT&E and 
IOT&E was after the installation of the AN/SPS-49 Radar). 
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The major objectives of this thesis were: to investigate 
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and analyze emerging test and evaluation policies within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy and to document and 
analyze the lessons learned at the CSLBTS from development 
to DSARC III. The lessons learned that are presented are 
those that are applicable to the CSLBTS and were of 
significance to the Officer in Charge or the Assistant for 
operations of the CSLBTS. These lessons are of an ongoing 
operational nature that would be of benefit to a future 
LBTS. 
D. CONTENT OF THESIS 
chapter II presents the results, as relate to test and 
evaluation, of major studies that were taking place during 
the evolution of the Guided Missile Frigate program. 
Additionally, the implementing directives that became 
effective during this same time frame are discussed. 
Chapter III contains the lessons learned at the Guided 
Missile Frigate Combat System Land-Based Test Site and 
discussions of these lessons as they relate to the studies 
and directives discussed in Chapter II. 
Chapter IV provides the conclusions of the author. 
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A. HISTORY 
Test and Evaluation is not new to the Navy. The Board of 
Inspection and survey (INSURV) began formally inspecting 
ships and their weapons systems about 1840 and became a 
legal body in 1882. 
An independent test agency (currently titled Operational 
Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR} and reporting directly 
to CNO) has been conducting operational testing since World 
War II. Tactically oriented at first, OPTEVFOR has for the 
past 20 years conducted operational evaluations of new 
systems as a part of the Navy's acquisition process. 
Two decades ago a?proval for service (ASU) was directed 
by OPNAV Instruction 4720.9 of March 1955. This directive 
(and revisions) established criteria for approval for 
service use and called for prototyping and evaluation by an 
independent agency where military characteristics or 
performance of ships and aircraft were affected. 
However, test and evaluation often was not conducted or 
inadequately conducted because of lack of funding or because 
of a system operational date requirement. Additionally, 
what tests were conducted were very often conducted after 
fleet introduction of the system and thus defined only what 
must be retrofitted. Test and evaluation was after the fact 
instead of being a part of the acquisition decision making. 
B. MAJOR STUDIES 
There have been several studies of the weapons system 
acquisition f~ocess in recent years that have delved into 
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the area of test and evaluation. Though the studies do not 
all come to the same conclusions they are consistent in that 
they agree that test and evaluation is one of the problems 
in the acquisition of weapons systems. 
1. ~1~ RibbQJl Qillnse Panel 
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by the 
President and the Secretary of Defense in July 1969 with a 
very broad charter to study, report and make recommendations 
on the organization and management of the Department of 
Defense, the Defense research and development efforts, the 
Defense procurement policies and practices, and such other 
matters as the Secretary may submit. 
The Panel in the report to The President and the 
secretary of Defense on 1 July 1970 had this to say on pages 
88-91 about operational Testing and Evaluation: 
Everyone seems to agree that Operational Testing and 
Evaluation (OT&E) is very important; however ,there are 
significant differences of opinion as to what it 
encompasses, what its proper objectives are, and what 
organi~atio~ and methods are necessary to accomplish it 
most e~fectively. 
It has been customary to think of OT&E in terms of 
physical testing {under various designations such as 
operational suitability testing, employment testing, 
service testing, or field experimentation) • It is 
essential to recognize that the primary goal of OT&E is 
operational evaluation, and that while operational testing 
is very important it is only one method of evaluation. To 
be effective, OT&E must be a total process using all 
appropriate methods of evaluation
1 
which spans the entire 
cycle of a system from initia requirement until it is 
phased out of the operational forces. If OT&E were 
limited to physical testing,it would lose much of its 
opportunity to contribute to decisions on whether to 
produce a system and would seldom be able even to 
influe~ce the systemf s characteristics and capabilities in 
any maJor way. 
Much OT&E does, however, involve physical testing and, 
therefor, it is important to distinguish between 
11 functional 11 testing and "operational" testing. 
Functional testing (often called engineering testing) 
is done to determine how well various systems and material 
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meet specifications-in other words, whether they meet 
technical requirements. 
By and large, functional testing in and for the 
Department of Defense appears to be well understood and 
faithfully executed. Serious golicy deficiencies are not 
apparent, and such failures in functional testing as occur 
can be primarily attributed to lack of technical 
competence, oversight, or procedural breakdowns. 
Functional testing is not considered to be a major problem 
area. 
operational testing, on the other hand, is done to 
determine to the extent possible whether such systems and 
material can meet operational requirements. It must 
provide advance knowledge as to wha~ their capabilities 
and limitations will be when they are subjected to the 
stresses of the environment for whicli they were designed 
(usually combat). operational testing must take into 
account the interface with other · systems and equipment 
tactics and techniques, organizational arrangements, an~ 
the human skills and frailties of the eventual users. 
There has been an increasing desire, particularly at 
OSD level, to use data from OT&E to assist in the 
decision-making process. anquestionably, it would be 
extremely useful to replace or support critical 
assumptions and educated guesses with quantitative data 
obtained fiom realistic and relevant operational testing. 
Unfortunately it has been almost impossible to obtain 
test results whic~ are directly applicable to decisions or 
useful for analyses. Often test aata do not exist. When 
they do, they frequently are derived from tests which are 
poorilI designed or conducted under insufficiently 
contra led conditions to permit valid comparisions. It is 
especially difficult to obtain test data in time to assist 
in decision-making. Significant changes are essential if 
OT&E is to realize its potential for contributing to 
imp9rtant decisions, particula~ily where the tests and 
decisions must cross Service lines. 
The Navy system of OT&E has two main characteristics: 
( 1) it is princip~lly ~ mplemented by an inQ.e2enden t OT&E 
organization reporting directly to the Ch1eI of Naval 
Operations ana (2) there is a formal way of getting 
operational evaluation !including some operational 
testing) done in the overal process. The main aef iciency 
in Navy OT&E is that it generally produces few hard data. 
It relies too much on the judgement of well-qualified 
officers and does not adequately utilize testing 
technigues available for obtaining measurements of 
scientific validity. 
The Panel had three recommendations specifically 
dealing with test and evaluation. The first recommendation 
placed responsibility for Defense test and evaluation at the 
Assistant Secretary 
(ASD(T&E)) level. 
of Defense (Test and Evaluation) 
The second recommendation placed 
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responsibility for overview of Defense test and evaluation 
effort with the Defense Test Agency (DTA).Both the ASD(T&E) 
and the DTA would be under the Deputy Secretary 
(Evalu.ation) • These recommendations were prompted by the 
limited and fragmented participation in or supervision of . 
operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) by the Office of the 
secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) • The third recommendation suggested the establishment 
of a separate progkam category for Test and Evaluation. 
?his recommendation was intended to maintain the integrity 
of the OT&E program by insuring funds were less vulnerable 
to diversion to other purposes. 
2. commission _sm Governm~ Procureme!!,1 
Congress, through Public Law 91-129, created the 
Commission on Government Procurement in November 1969 to 
study and recommend to Congress methods to promote the 
economy, efficiency, and effectiness of procurement by the 
executive branch of the Federal government. 
The Commission in the Report of the Commission on 
Government Procurement, Volume 2, December 1972, pages 
154-166 had this to say about Operational Test and 
Evaluation: 
Trial and error is an important part of the normal 
design process. Planned experimenta~ion with hardware is 
the most economical and fastest means of developing a good 
product. Paper studies and theoretical analyses are 
always based on assumptions and existing knowledge; 
testing deals vi th realities, _not vi th assumptions. 
DOD has separated agency testing into two types: 
development test and evaluation (DT&E) and operational 
test and evaluation 10T&E). The primary aifference 
between DT&E and OT&E is in purpose; that is, the kind of 
knowledge they are intended to obtain. This difference 
influences how and by whom the tests are conducted. 
DT&E is part of the repetitive R&D process of 
design-test-evaluate-redesign that continues until 
technical uncertainties and reliability problems are 
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resolved. DT&E is usually a semi-sc~entific mea~urem~nt 
of individual performance against engineering 
specifications such as weight, speed, payload, and 
accuracy. 
OT&E tests the operational usefulness of a system. 
This testing gauges h9W well the system sh9uld perform tn 
the expected operational or combat environment, bow it 
should be employed, and whether the system can be operated 
and maintained effectively by typical field personnel. 
At least some limited form of OT&E is necessary as 
early as possible in a major system program in order to 
make sure that the engineering specifications, validated 
through development testing, nave operational value. OT&E 
can be used for example, to field test the simulation of a 
new system feature using parts of old systems. 
OT&E after development of a system but prior to 
production is an important agency tast. This testing 
should be as complete and realistic as possible so that 
surprises from deployed operational systems are avoided. 
After full production begins, OT&E continues to identify 
changes that should be incorporated when a new system is 
deployed to the user. 
Develofmental testing is conducted by technical 
specialists and scientistsi operational testing, however1 is conducted by specialists who ~ave operationa 
experience as well. The test objective is to determine 
how well a system will work in actual operations: 
•••• combat experience suggests that weapons with 
new and different characteristics are subject to 
(per+ormance] degredations which are difficult to 
predict •••• 
Combat [performance] degredation is a phenomenon 
~hat may worsen a minor fault in the same way that 
inaccuracy of a missile in combat is often several 
times that in test-range demonstrations. 
The tension of battle, countermeasures, unfamiliar 
terrain, and marginal weather are some of the variables 
missing in the usual development test environment. 
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the 
military components have recently modified their testing 
sequence to require an "initial OT&E" to be reported 
through operational channels to a headquarters level prior 
to a production decision. An "initial OT&E" often is an 
additional function conducted concurrently with normal 
development tests. A follow-on OT&E is performed on 
production articles in preparation for operational use. 
The Navy has a seperate Operational Test and 
Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR} that maintains small test 
groups and detachments staffed with short-tour individuals 
naving recent operational experience. The head of 
OPTEVPOR currently reports to the Chief of Naval 
Operations. In praetice
1 
naval surface ship systems have 
been treated different y from other programs. OPTEVPOR 
does not test new surface ships or most ship subsystems or 
20 
their integration prior to fleet introduction. 
In mid-1971 a Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation 
was established .in ~he Office of the Director~ ~efen~e 
Research and Engine~ring {DDR&E) •. T~e new oifice .is 
responsible for policy ~aking, mo~itorinq1 and eyaluating developmental and operational ~esting of tne services. 
This office now requires each military service to 
define the critical issues and uncertainties to be 
addressed during subsequent test ~nd evaluation pha~es. 
The results of tlie tests and evaluations by the services 
are to be used for major program decisions, including 
those to begin final development and to begin production. 
The Commission had the following recommendations 








agency head approval and congressional 
for full production and use of new systems 
need has been reconfirmed and the system 
has been tested and evaluated in an 
tha~ .closely approximates the expected 
conditions. 
Establish in each agency component an operational test 
and evalu~tio~ activity seperate from the developer and 
user organizations. 
Continue efforts to strengthen test and evaluation 
capabilities in the military services with emphasis on: 
Tactically oriented test designers. 
Test personnel with operational and scientific 
background. 
Tactical and environmental realism. 
setting critical test objectives, evaluation, and 
reporting. 
Establish an agencywide definition of the scope of 
operational test and evaluation to include: 
Assessment of critical performance characteristics 
of ~n emerging system to determine usefulness to 
ultimate users. 
Two-~ided adve~sary-type. testing when needed to 
provide operational realism. 
Operational test and evaluation during the system 
life cycle as changes occur in need assessment, 
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mission goals and as a result of 
modifications to the system. 
technical 
The Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition Review 
Committee was established by the Secretary of the Navy in 
August 1974 to assess the organization, management, 
staffing, and procedures used by the Department of the Navy 
in developing and producing major weapon systems. It was 
created in response to the need to find ways of reducing 
acquisition costs while maintaining the quality of weapon 
systems and ensuring the national defense. 
NMARC in January 1975 in Volume I pages IV-1 thru 
IV-24 of the report had the following to say concerning test 
and evaluation: 
T&E is obviously a necessity to insure receiet of the 
best possible military equipment. Howevert it is evident 
that guality cannot be tested or evaluated into a product. 
Beliani+ity, or quality,_ must be built tn by sound and 
approp~iate concepts, requirements, and design; by _proper 
executicn of the concept through good engineering and 
testing· and finally by the use of the most appropriate 
materials, equipment, and production methods. Experience 
has shown that to develop well engineered systems it 
becomes necessary to test and evaluate throughout the 
entire acquisition process, essentially in five basic 
areas: 
Prior to final selection of materials and equipment 
and their applications. 
During the engineering design phase. 
During the component or subsystem assembly. 
During trials or inspections that are conducted to 
determine specification compliance. 
And finallit operationally to determine 
performance, imitations, and effectiveness against 
the threat which generated the requirement. 
The integration of the modern weapons suite with the 
platform, be it a ship or an aircraft, presents a comElex 
problem for the designer, the engineer< the Qro]ect 
manager, and the test planner. With the aavent of full 
digital Command and Control systems interfacing with 
digital sensor and weapons management, the Navy has 
experienced difficulty in assuring that the 
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hardware/software interface is properly established and 
maintained through the ayquisit~on process •. Additionally~ 
the Navy is faced wi~h life-cycle interface ana 
configuration control management for which there are no 
established procedures. 
Th~ delivery of USS California (DLGN-36) during the 
past year was marred by poor and deficient performance of 
its fully digitized weapons system. The problems were 
foreseen before delivery, and a deliberate decision was 
made to accept the snip with the problem to be solved 
later. This situation is indicative of a broader problem 
within the Navy which was not fully appreciated at the 
initiation of the DLGN-36 program during the 1960s. That 
is the Navy has accepted the technical complexity of 
moAern systems for installation without the advances in 
management methods and resource dedication to coordinate 
the asse~bly# test~ configuration, changes( evaluati9n, 
and validation OI complex systems as reaay for service 
use. The DLGN-36 system is an example of inadequate 
system integration and configuration control which would 
serve as a lesson learned for future systems. 
Fortunately, the Panel sees the Navy taking positive 
steps-in specific programs-to close the integration 
management gap. 
In the Patrol Frigate program, a Combat System Land 
Based Test site lias been established under direct 
Government contract with the Sperry Company which is 
tasked with overall integration responsibility. In 
addition to equipment checkout, this site will provide 
training. 
The Test and Evaluation Panel of the NMARC made 20 
recommendations in the Test and Evaluation area. The Panel 
provided the following summary of their findings: 
In sumary, the r&E Panel finds the Navy making good 
progress in test and evaluation matters. The material 
area in need of the most attention is in the surface 
warfare systems, which is addressed specifically in 
several of the Panel's recommendations. However, the most 
important consideration the Panel found is that the Navy 
should restructure its acquisition management approach to 
ensure that the acquisition of material is - totally 
relevant to the projected threat. The lead recommendation 
concerns th~s finding and is supported by several other 
recommendations. 
John s. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E), established a Task Force under the 
Chairmanship of Dr. Eugene G. Fubini as a part of the 
Defense Science Board. 












activities, where to concentrate more heavily and how to 
give the test and evaluation activities 
potential payoff. 
the highest 
The Task Force was chartered in a letter from DDR&E 
to Dr. Eugene G. Fubini on 14 November 1972 to determine: 
Whether the program had cost schedule, or performance 
difficulties; from what specific aspects of the program 
these difficulties arose; ana when the difficulty first 
became apperent !e.g., during.design veri+ication testing, 
acceptance testing, operational testing, or after 
deployment) • 
For each program and specific difficulty, was the 
discovery of the problem as early as reasonably could have 
been expected? If not, what additional test measure 
reasonably could have been taken that might have found the 
difficulties? What test changes in the testing of future 
similar programs would appear warranted? 
Based on the analysis of the entire group of programs, 
what areas and what potential problems should we examine 
more thoroughly and through what type and phase of 
testing? Purtlier, are there areas in which excessive 
testing has been or is being carried out? 
The Task Force, in the report in April 1974, 
summarized and delineated procedures to be observed and 
general guidelines to be followed for the use of members of 
the Department of Defense and the developers of weapons 
systems in preparing, reviewing and monitoring the test and 
evaluation asFects of development programs. A check list of 
items that must be covered was prepared as an additional 
aid. 
The Task ?orce endorsed the policies of Department of 
Defense Directive 5000.3, Test and Evaluation, and developed 
guidelines to be used in conjunction with these policies. 
The Task Force in its report on pages 17-19 provide 
the following thoughts on ship testing: 
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The testing of ships considered as a system rather 
than an aggreate of items is a new concept. There could 
be a tendency not to give serious consideration to 
Directive 5000.3 because of the many loopholes left in the 
directive. The Task Force believes that it must restate, 
at greater length, the procedures given in Directive 
5000.3 for testing ships, and emphasize the importance of 
not bypassing any of the steps. 
DOD Directive 5000.3 states that, "to the degree 
practicable first generation subsystems will have been 
approved for service use prior to the initiation of 
integrated operational testing." Subsystem approval for 
service use, by application of other provisions of the 
Directive, should oe preceded by extensive development and 
operational test and evaluation. The Task Force urges 
that "first generation" should be liberally interpreted to 
include subsystems RreviouslX approved for service use but 
which bavE been improved or modified for the new 
application. It is essential that the DCP for the ship 
program identify, and make provision for resolution of any 
remaining uncer~ainties about the qualification of 
critical subsystems for inclusion in the ship. Note that 
the provision of the Directive relates to initiation of 
integrated testing rather than to initiation of 
construction of the lead ship. It is assumed that the 
lead ship could be well into construction before all 
equipments were service approved •. 
"When combat system complexity warrants, there is to 
be constructed a combat system test installation wherein 
the weapon, sensor, and information processing subsystems 
are integra~ed through their interfaces in the manner 
expected in the ship class." The Task Force believes that 
all combatant classes and most-auxr.ria~~ciasse.s~-sfi~Qs 
~guie£ea--ror oceanuse-woura neorsurf"ICieiitcomplexrt:l 
£g :!arrant suc!!~es-t: YnstaI];IT.J:on.- -
The foregoing words allow either a land-based or 
at-sea installation, and, possibly, a good deal of 
latitude about the detail to be incorporated in the 
installation. It is recommended that the installation, at 
a minimum, include accurate, geometrically identical 
spacing and placement of all critical equipments, at least 
mockups of other installed equipment in spaces, cable and 
'Utilitl conduits and piping iaentical to tnat to be 
instal ed in the production ship, antennas, lighting and 
ventilation as in tne production snips (even if augmented 
for non-test repair and modification) , and provision for 
feeding the test system either real or simulated input as 
it would cccur in operational situations. Real inputs 
should be used if at all possible and simulated inputs 
permitted only in cases such as sonar on a land-based test 
installation. 
If the new class of ships incorporates advancements in 
propulsion technology, there should be a propulsion test 
site. The Task Force feels that its interpretation of the 
policy of 5000.3 as it applies to a combat systems test 
site. is equally applicable to a propulsion test site if 
one is required. 
The Directive also states, "for all new ship classes 
continuing phases of OT&E on the lead ship will be 
conducted at sea as early in the acquisition process as 
possible for specified systems or equipments and, if 
required, full ship operational evaluation to the degree 
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feasible." The Task Force would add that where possible, 
in the case of a large number of shiEs in a class~ no more 
YOlIOw -snip~- than necessary--for- econQmy----ana --earry 
afp~Q1meiff e -contra~ecrnerore-cQmpI~ion of-tnis ¥hase 
o est'ing. "-l'he--Tasrl'orce--aiso urges-tnat-con ract:'. 
metliOas-oe devised to minimize the cost impact of changes 
found necessary in such operational testing. 
The Task Force concurs that there should be 
prototyping of the entire ship and combat system if new 
ship's hull design will contain technological advancements 
and/or significant scale-ups of previously proven 
technologies, with operational tests at sea prior to 
production commitments to follow ships. 
S. Comptroller General Rep~rt To The Committee On ~Q 
~Ice~ Ho~ ~1i~f:_g5en atives---
The Comptroller General's Report to the Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives on Cost Growth In 
Major Weapon Systems, Department of Defense, in March 1973 
on page 48 has the following discussion regarding test and 
evaluation: 
It is particularly desirable to demonstrate design and 
operational utility at each decision point in the systems 
acquisition process. The user and the test organizations 
should simulate combat conditions and should conduct 
adversarial testing to develop data about probable 
performance under battle conditions. They should reassess 
the actual need for the weapons performance and whether 
performance, if attained, will be combat effective. 
Whenever weapons are to be used in joint combat 
operations, joint-service testing should be mandatory. It 
is important that such test data be preserved to guide 
designers of follow-on and related new systems. 
When prototypes are fabricated, the user should 
participate in testing them. Users can help cc~pare 
proposea new systems with alternative systems. The 
objective woula be to evaluate the ne~ systems 
effectiveness, survivabilityl and reliability in expected 
operating environments. Wi 1 the proposed system justify 
tlie procurement and associated operating and maintenance 
costs? The user's tests should be separate and 
indep~ndent of those conducted by the development and test 
agencies. 
C. IMPLEMENTING DIRECTIVES 
The previous section of this thesis presented the results 
of some major studies that were conducted during the growth 
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of the Guided Missile Frigate program. It is the intent of 
this section to follow the implementing directives during 
the same period of time. 
DODD 5000. 1, Acquisition of Major Defense Systems, 
was issued in July 1971 and establishes policy for major 
defense system acquisition. 
In the area of test and evaluation, paragraphs 
III.C.5 and 6 apply directly and are as follows: 
Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed. 
Progressive commitments of resources which incur program 
risR will be made only when confidence in program outcome 
is sufficiently higli to ~arrant going ahead. Models 
mockups and sys~em hardware will be used to the greatest 
possible extent to increase confidence level. 
Test and evaluation shall commence as early as 
possible. A determination of operational suitability, 
including logistic support requirements will be maae 
prior to large-scale production commitments, making use of 
the most realistic test environment possible and tlie best 
representation of the future operational srstem available. 
The results of this operational testing wi l be evaluated 
and presented to the DSARC at the time of the production 
decision.· 
DODD 5000.3, Test and Evaluation, was issued in 
January 1973 and establishes policy for the conduct of test 
and evaluation by the Military Departments and Defense 
Agencies in the acquisition of defense systems and codifies 
the responsibilities of the Deputy Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering, Test and Evaluation (DD(T&E)). 
The directive provides definitions of Development 
Test and Evaluation and Operational Test and Evaluation. It 
requires in each DOD Component a major field agency that is 
separate from the developing command to be responsible for 
OT&E. The directive requires separation of operational 
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testing and development testing. Additionally, the 
directive requires that at least an initial phase of 
operational test· and evaluation be accomplished prior to the 
first major production decision. The IOT&E must be adequate 
to provide a valid estimate of expected operational 
effectiveness and suit~bility. These requirements are 
carryovers from a series of memorandums by the Deputy 
secretary of Defense in 1971. 
The directive also specifically addresses test and 
evaluation for ships. It requires test installations for 
complex 
of the 
combat systems to provide IOT&E of the integration 
subsystems prior to the follow ship production 
decision. 
DODD 5000.3 is contained in Appendix A. 
3. ~ECNAV Instructi2~ 200~ 
SECNAVINST 5000.1, System Acquisition in the 
Department of the Navy, issued on 13 March 1972 implements 
DODD 5000.1 within the Department of the Navy, establishes 
policy and management principles for acquisition of systems 
within the Department of the Navy and consolidates SECNAV, 
OFNAV, HQMC, and NAVMAT systems acquisition policy. 
Enclosure (3) of 
acquisition policy, 
Section I.A.1. requires 
the instruction contains the systems 
relationships and responsibilities. 
of Project Managers coordination 
with the Director, Research, Development Test and Evaluation 
(DRDT&E) to ensure adequate operational test planning and 
operational test and evaluation accomplishment. Section 
II.c.2. requires the following: 
A determination of operational suitability, including 
logistic support requirements, will be made prior to major 
production commitments. The operational testing conducted 
with use of the best representation of the future system 
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in a realistic test environment, will be the basis of this 
timely determination and subsequent production approval. 
The following guidelines apply: 
The doctrine of conducting initial operational test 
and evaluation prior to production decision will 
apply to all significant acquisition programs. 
Requirements documentation shall reflect this fact. 
Acquisition programs meeting the thresholds of DOD 
Directive 5000.1 shall not normally be proposed to 
the DSARC for SECDEF approval for production prior 
to completion of requisite operational test and 
evaluation. 
For systems/equipment not meeting the thresholds of 
DOD Directive 5000.1 the CNO or CMC as 
appropriate, shall ~esignate those which will 
require operation~l test and evaluation prior to 
approval Ior service use. 
Deviations to the above which would obviate the 
completion of requisite test and evaluation shall 
be granted only by, or with, the concurrence of the 
SECNAV. 
Section III.D. deals specifically with Test and 
Evaluation under Program Considerations. 
excerpts from Section III.D: 
Following are 
The wide variety of naval weapons dictates varying 
aEproaches to the conduct of test and evaluation; sucli 
e~fort shall be tailored to the needs and 
characterizations of each individual acguisition--prime 
consideration being given to adequate operationally 
oriented testing. Normally the following general seguence 
of events should prevail: (1) laboratory/contractor 
preliminary test and evaluation of demonstration hardware 
auring the conceptual effort, (2) contractor/development 
activity test ana evaluation of subsystems and/or 
full-scale demonstration hardware during full-scale 
development, (3) technical test and evaluation conducted 
by the contractor with the Navy/Marine Corps participation 
during pre-production/production, (4) IOT&.E {Initial 
Opera~ional Test and Evaluation) by or with the active 
participation of Navy operational forces prior to the 
major production decision, (5) Navy/Marine Corps OPEVAL 
(Operational Test and Evaluation) prior to approval for 
service use and inventory acceptance (except for ships) < 
16) Navy/Marine Cor2s follow-on test and evaluation, ana 7) the conduct of tests and evaluations by the Board of nspection and survey (BIS) and recommendation to the 
Chief of Naval O~erations for service acceptability. Test 
and evaluation effort shall be effectively correlated with 
previously outlined requirements concerning approval of 
material for service use. Specifically, the procedural 
aspects of requirements determination, research and 
development, manufacture of service tast model(s) ( 
technical evaluation initial operational test ana 
evaluation, full operational evaluation, and approval for 
service use shall be correlated. 
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New acquisition includes conversions, major 
modifications and modernizations. Adeguate test and 
evaluation of these is also required to (1t support design 
and development activity, (2) measure performance against 
specified acceptance cri~eria~(3) ensure satisfactory 
operation with related inter~acing systems,(4} confirm 
operational effectiveness and suitability, and(S) validate 
the adequacy of documentation for support and test 
equipment, personnel training, maintenance and operation 
of the whole system/subsystems, and other elements. 
For new acquisitions including those not subject to 
thresholds established in DOD Directive 5000.1 the 
principles of early operational test and evaluation tefore 
produc~ion decision
1 
participation by OPNAV user or Marine 
Corps user personne and participation by the Marine 
corps or COMOPTEVF6R (Commander, Operational Test and 
Evaluation Force) shall apply. The purpose of IOT&E and 
other tests is to provide assessments and recommendations 
by an activity independent from the development activity 
concerning the future operational suitability of system 
under development. 
The objective of the overall operational test and 
evaluation effort for any program is to aid in providing~ 
at major decision points in the development ana 
acquisition process, the best information possible at that 
point in time as to: the military utility of the 
prospective system; its expected operational 
effectiveness, operational suitability (including 
rel~a~ility, m~intainability, simplicity< 19gistic, ana 
train+ng .reguireme~ts); need .for modifications; and the 
organization, doctrine and tactics for system deployment. 
OPNAVINST 3960.8 of 22 January 1973 establishes 
guidance and policy for test and evaluation of all Navy 
weapons systems including ships, aircraft, subsystems, 
components and support systems. The guidance and policy is 
in accordance with DODD 5000.3 and SECNAVINST 5000.1. 
The instruction requires that: 
~h~ acquisition of Navy weapons systems shall make 
provisions for such test and evaluation programs as are 
necessary to (1) permit a 9l~ar determination of service 
acceptability ana suitabi+ity.by 9ompetent.authority;!2) 
support the aevelopm~nt ~ctivi~ies in .evolving a desiqn 
which meets specifications and service requirements; (3) 
suppo;-t the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) review and 
decision process. 
The instruction separates test and evaluation into 
the areas of development testing, operational testing, and 
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acceptance trials. 
In Enclosure (1) 
definitions are provided: 
of the instruction the following 
Development Test and Evaluation (D+&E) : Test ~nd 
evaluation performed by or for the developing agency which 
emphasizes the technological and engineering aspects of 
the system, or equipment items. Normally carried out 
under strictly controlled conditions. 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) : Tests and 
evaluations participated in or performed by operational 
personnel focusing on operational effectiveness and 
suitability (including reliability, compatibility 
interoperaoili~y, maintainability, ana supportabilitYl. It 
also includes ~he development of optimum operational 
tactics for systems and equipment being developed for 
service use. 
Operational test and evaluation is divided into 
initial operational test and evaluation and follow-on 
operational test and evaluation. The OPNAV Instruction 
defines them as: 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E): That 
T&E accomplished prior to the DSARC Milestone III or 
comparatle CNO or CHNAVMAT first major production decision 
point to permit assessment of the operational 
effectiveness and suitability of a weapon system. 
Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation: FOT&E is 
the continuing operational test and evaluation of a ~eapon 
system conducted in an operational environment by 
operational personnel using production systems for the 
purpose of verifying system performance; validating 
correction of deficiencies previously identified; and 
refining tactical employment doc~rine and requirements for 
personnel and training. FOT&E may be initiated using 
pilot or pre-production systems which most closely 
resemble the production units until the latter items are 
available. 
SECNAVINST 5000.1 assigned COMOPTEVFOR 
responsibilities as an Independent Test Agency for the 
required operational test and evaluation of new weapons 
systems. OP NA VIN ST 3960.8 requires COMOPTEVFOR 
participation in planning and conducting of tests of new 
systems commencing at the beginning of system formulation. 
OPNAVINST 3960.8 additionally provides Test and Evaluation 
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checklists for Milestones I, II and III. 
As an outgrowth of the Defense Science Board Task 
Force on Test and Evaluation DD(T&E) published on 2 April 
1974 a series of Test and Evaluation (T&E) guidelines. The 
guidelines provide checklists of T&E considerations for the 
conceptual, validation, full-scale engineering development 
and substantial production/deployment phases of weapon 
system acquisition. 
In addition to Ship Systems, guidelines have been 
published for Aircraft Systems, Missile Weapon Systems, 
Ground Vehicle Systems, ASW Systems, Airborne ECM Systemi, 
Airborne General surveillance Radar systems, Command and 
Control Systems and Common Test Gear. 
OPNAVINST 3960.10, Test and Evaluation, of 22 October 
1975 implements DODD 5000.3 with Change 2 within the Navy 
and consolidates OPNAVINSTs 3930.8B, Assignment and 
prosecuticn of test and evaluation projects, 3960.8, Test 
and evaluation of Navy systems and equipments, and 3960.9A, 
Test and evaluation of ship acquisition. 
This instruction, in one document, establishes policy 
for test and evaluation in Navy acquisition programs. 
D. SUM.MARY 
This chapter has shown the results of major studies 
investigating the weapon systems acquisition process 
sponsored by both the legislative branch and the highest 
levels of the executive branch of the government. These 
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studies were conducted during the evolution of the Guided 
Missile Frigate program. 
The study results differentiate between developmental 
test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation and 
stress the importance of realistic operational test and 
evaluation as part of the acquisition process. This 
operational test and evaluation is of particular importance 
prior to the major production decision. 
The earlier studies emphasize the need for strengthening 
the operational test and evaluation program and conclude 
that the developmental or functional test and evaluation is 
well in hand. However, the later studies point out the 
weaknesses of the integration of Navy surface warfare 
systems. 
Additionally, the chapter follows the implementing 
directives that impact test and evaluation during the 
evolution of the Guided ~issile Frigate program. 
The directives, as did the studies, separate 
developmental test and evaluation and operational test and 
evaluation and place requirements on both in reducing risks 
and eliminating doubts, particularily for the major 
production decision. The directives also introduce the 
requirement for land-based test sites for ship acquisition 
programs. The studies and the directives stress the 
importance of the operation of the weapon system by user 
personnel during the operational test and evaluation. 
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III. LESSQNS LEARNED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Lessons learned is a rather subtle concept. It is not 
just a list of errors that were once made while pursuing 
specific objectives. Nor is lessons learned a checklist of 
things that are necessary to ensure success. Lessons 
learned encompasses the recognition of potential problem 
areas, the avoidance of mistakes that could readily be made 
again in similar circumstances, and the ways that previous 
successes cculd be improved to better meet the given 
objectives. Lessons learned are of import only when related 
to objectives. Lessons learned that are related to one 
objective can be generalized and extended and be applicable 
to other similar objectives. 
This chapter presents the lessons learned at the Guided 
Missile Frigate Combat System Land-Based Test Site. The 
lessons learned discussed are limited to those that are 
applicable to the CSLBTS and were of significance to the 
Officer in Charge and/or the Assistant for Operations of the 
CSLBTS. 
Not to be discussed are larger-scale lessons learned 
related to the acquisition of combat systems. Thcugh a 
quick comfarison of the IOT&E results, or even the fact that 
IOT&E could be conducted, with the status of the oss 
California (DLGN-36) at delivery would lead to the 
conclusion that the use of a CSLBTS is a valuable lesson 
learned to improve the acquisition of combat systems. Also 
eliminated are those items that are unique to the location 
of the CSLBTS and the administrative experience of the 
CSLBTS staff. The author concurs that personnel messing, 
berthing, and administrative reports are important and can 
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require an inordinate amount of time and effort on the part 
of the CSLBTS staff if the LBTS is located at a contractors 
facility that is remote from any major military installation 
as is the case with the FFG CSLBTS. But the requirements 
and their significance will be different at each site 
location. Additionally the NMARC recommended and there has 
been recent strong Congressional pressure to construct 
future LBTS at military installations. Therefore personnel 
messing, berthing, and administrative reports will not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
B. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The author spent three days at the CSLBTS in August 1975. 
Prior to the author's visit to the site the Officer in 
Charge and the Assistant for Operations had prepared a list 
of forty three lessons learned (The Assistant for Operations 
completed his Master's Thesis, The Patrol Frigate Combat 
System Land-Based Test Site, at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in June 1974). The author's three days at the CSLBTS 
were spent discussing the lessons learned with the Officer 
in Charge and his staff, and the Sperry Systems Management 
Program Manager for FFG-7 Class Combat System Integration 
and his staff. At the time of the author's visit the CSLBTS 
was in the final stages of Phase II of DT&E. Phase II of 
IOT&E was conducted during the week following the visit. 
The author has had periodic discussions by telephone with 
the Assistant for Operations since the August visit. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Historically land-based test sites have been the domain 
of the system developer. The test sites were constructed to 
aid the engineering design and development process for 
equipments and systems. Of particular value was the use of 
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LBTS for the integration of 
developing agent designed 
scheduled the operations, 
satisfy the objectives 
personnel were injected into 
try to achieve meaningful 
results. 
equipments into a system. The 
the sites, devised the tests, 
and aligned 
of the test 
the resources to 
site. Operating 
the development test teams to 
operational demonstrations and 
Returning to the objectives of the FFG LBTS as presented 
to the DSARC I/II in September 1972 shows that the LBTS 
usage as envisioned then was still in the domain of the 
developer. 
subsequent to the FFG DSARC I/II presentation were the 
Program Decision Memorandum, the DCP, DODD 5000.3, and 
implementing Navy directives all calling for IOT&E proir to 
the major production decision. 
The objectives of DT&E as defined by paragraph IV.B of 
DODD 5000.3 are to: 
•••• demonstrate that the engineering design 
development process is complete; demonstrate that 
design risks have been minimized; demonstrate that 




The objective of OT&E during Full-scale development as 
defined by Faragraph IV.C of DODD 5000.3 is to: 
assist in evaluating operational effectiveness 
and suitability {including compatibility 
int~roperatility, . relia~ility, maintainability, anA 
logistic and training requiremen~s) • 
In other words the objectives of DT&E is to answer the 
question, "Dees the machine work?" The objectives of OT&E is 
to answer the question, "Are personnel supported by the 
machine such that the result is an effective weapon?" 
The first Navy contract with Sperry Systems Division to 
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construct the CSLBTS is dated 19 March 1973. Phase II of 
IOT&E was conducted at the CSLBTS during August 1975. 
During this two and a half year period the staff of the 
CSLBTS observed a shift of the site mission from satisfying 
the needs of the developing agent to meeting the IOT&E 
requirements. It can logically be said that one follows the 
other, that is, that IOT&E should follow the development and 
integration of the system and there should be a shift in the 
site mission. However, the ultimate mission of the LBTS 
should be recognized during the conceptual stage. A 
sequence of objectives of the Combat system Land-Based Test 
Site is shown in Appendix B. 
Of the forty three lessons learned the pbservation by the 
staff of the CSLBTS that the uses of a LBTS during its life 
exceed the original objectives of the LBTS provides a 
central theme. The missions of the LBTS impact on site 
configuration, personnel training and manning, testing, 
maintenance, documentation, and logistics. 
The author has divided the remaining forty two lessons 
learned into the categories of configuration of the LBTS, 
personnel training and manning, testing, maintenance, 
documentation, and logistics. Additionally items of a like 
nature have been combined into one discussion. The 
rationale for the selected categories is that they match 
those areas that are impacted by site objectives. In 
addition, the categorization and the combination of similar 
items permit an orderly thought flow and allow discussions 
of a more general nature than would be possible if each of 
the forty two items were presented individually. 
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DODD 5000.3 Paragraph IV.D.1 requires: 
•••• there will be constructed a combat system test 
installation wherein the weapon, sensor, and information 
processing subsystems are integra~ed through their 
interfaces in the manner expected in the ship class. 
The interpretation of the above requirement is 
significantly different if the mission of the LBTS is system 
development and integration than it is if the mission is 
IOT&E. 
a. Aim configuration of LBTS toward IOT&E 
requirements, not development and integration requirements. 
This lesson was recognized as it became obvious 
that the CSLBTS mission would include IOT&E and liason with 
OPTEVFOR provided definition of the scope of IOT&E. 
More real life equipment is necessary to support 
IOT&E than is necessary to support development and 
integration. For example, in CIC all radio circuits must be 
real and terminated either at an external 
transmitter/receiver or terminated at an internal central 
center that will simulate external stations to satisfy 
IOT&E. To satisfy development and integration few if any of 
the radio circuits in CIC are necessary. They could be 
dummied to check cable runs and design drawings. 
The internal circuit 
development testing are much less 







maintenance circuits while IOT&E require both maintenance 
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and command and control circuits. Additionally, vertical 
plotting boards and status boards are only necessary to 
support IOT&E. They are in fact part of the information 
processing subsystem. 
The degree of simulation of the external 
environment is greater to satisfy IOT&E than development and 
integration. Both require threat simulations but the IOT&E 
requires more flexibility in the use of the threats in a 
given scenario than does development and integration. 
Additionally, IOT&E requires simulation of friendly forces 
that can be made responsive to tactical commands that would 
not be necessary to support systems development. 
Unless the test site is located such that IOT&E 
can be conducted utilizing a real supporting task force the 
control center that coordinates the environment stressing 
the system must be more complex to support IOT&E than to 
support development. The IOT&E control center must control 
the threats, maneuver the friendly forces consistent with 
the system under test, and also provide a termination of 
internal system signals that will respond consistent with 
the scenario being faced. 
b. Involve developing agency testers and OPTEVFOR 
early during construction of site. 
This lesson is included under site configuration 
because not only is there a significant configuration 
difference because of mission as has already been discussed 
but there are major differences in the data gathering 
requirements of DT&E and IOT&E. The different requirements 
for data requires different equipment to obtain the data. 
Having both groups of testers involved early allows orderly 
integration of the data gathering equipment such as timing 
generators, audio recorders, video recorders, and digital 
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information recorders. Additionally, all parties concerned 
will be aware of the LBTS capabilities and restrictions and 
will be able to plan tests accordingly. 
c. Establish liason with Board of Inspection and 
survey (INSORV) early in construction of the site. 
Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) 
is defined by paragraph IV.F of DODD 5000.3 as: 
•••• test and evaluation of Qroduction items to 
demonstrate that the items procured fulfill the requirements 
and specifications of the procuring contract or agreements 
Most PAT&E is the responsibility of the 
developing agent. However, INSURV is responsible to the CNO 
for conducting acceptence trials of new ships. The 
equipment SFaces at the LBTS will be built to the ship 
spec.ifications. Therefore it is logical to inject the INSURV 
Board interpretation of the requirements into the product as 
it is being formed instead of waiting until the lead ship 
has been constructed and has been subjected to acceptance 
trials. 
d. Define carefully to what extent the site 
duplicates equipment that will be installed on ship. 
Paragraph IV.D.1 of DODD 5000.3 requires at a 
combat system test installation that, "···· the weapon, 
sensor, and information processing subsys_tems are integrated 
through their inter£aces in the manner expected in the ship 
class." Paragraph rv.:.4 of the same directive requires, 
" IOT&E will be accomplished prior to the first major 
production decisicn adequate to provide a valid estimate of 
expected system operational effectiveness and 
suitability •••• " Paragraph IV.D.1 of DODD 5000.3 requires 
that, "To the degree practicable first generation subsystems 
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will have been approved for service use prior to the 
initiation of integrated operational testing." 
One important reason for the existence of the 
CSLBTS is the reduction of risks and the elimination of 
doubt as to the development, integration, and operational 
effectiveness and suitability of the combat system. To 
validly assess the ship's expected performance from the data 
provided by the CSLBTS all equipment differences must be 
known and the impact of the differences addressed. 
Eguipments that have not been approved for 
service use are an element of risk because they could be 
used at the LETS to establish the data base and fail to be 
approved for service use and not be installed on the ship. 
This problem can arise with those pieces of equipment that 
everyone assumes is part of another subsystem that had prior 
service use approval. 
The equipment installed at the site will be 
either government furnished equipment (GFE) or contractor 
furnished eguipment (CFE). The GFE will be controlled by 
managers that are providing their equipment not only to the 
CSLBTS but to other programs as well. These managers have 
production schedules that include the installation of some 
changes en the production line and other changes that must 
be installed after the equipment has left the production 
line. The CSLBTS may receive one of the equipments that has 
all the changes already installed or it may receive 
equipment with only part of the changes installed. Thus all 
GFE equipment received at the site must be specifically 
checked to ensure that the ordalt/field change status 
matches what it is thought to be. What is ordered is not 
always what is received for installation. 
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e. Have Naval Safety Center inspect site. 
Since a variety of personnel representing the 
system integration contractor, the development agent, and 
the operational testing agency, and a multitude of visiting 
firemen will find it necessary to spend some time at the 
test site it is mandatory that there be essentially no 
safety hazards at the site. 
2. gersonnel Trainin~ ~ng fg_nning 
Paragraph IV.C of DODD 5000.3 provides a definition 
of OT&E and requires, "OT&E will be accomplished by 
operational and support personnel of the type and 
qualifications of those expected to use and maintain the 
system when deployed ····" 
Personnel training requirements and the 
responsibility for providing adequate training are 
significantly different for the site missions of development 
or IOT&E. 
As an example the systems integration contractor can 
be expected to provide the training necessary for the crew 
to operate the combat system as designedr which would 
satisfy the requirements of the developing agent and most 
single ship IOT&E evolutions. But what of the training 
requirements necessary to allow a ship system to participate 
in a larger task force system? The system integration 
contractor could provide the training necessary to operate 
the task force linking equipment such as communication 
transmitters and receivers and Naval Tactical Data System 
(NTDS) links. But the system integration contractor should 
not be expected to provide the necessary training in such 
areas as voice communication proceduresr use of tactical 
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signal books, voice communication security, and tactics 
necessary in a multiship or ship and aircraft environment 
that requires coordination of the ships and/or aircraft to 
fulfill a mission. 
a. Attempt to match manning to proposed manning 
document for system. 
Even if the proposed manning document is matched 
identically it is questionable if the IOT&E at the LBTS will 
be accomplished by personnel of the type and qualifications 
of those expected to use the system when deployed. The site 
personnel will have observed the construction of the site 
essentially from the ground up. Then they would have 
observed the integration contractor work with the subsystems 
contractors in their efforts to make the site operational 
and ready to turn over to the Navy. After that they would 
have participated as part of the team during DT&E. 
Additionally they would have received their training from 
the contractor. The contractor is motivated to provide the 
best training possible because he is aware that a production 
decision could depend on the performance of the sailcrs he 
is training. Thus their familiarity with the system is not 
what would be typical in the fleet except possibly for new 
construction crews which go through a similar evolution with 
their shiF· 
To provide a valid assessment of system 
effectiveness an attempt must be made to be as realistic in 
the manning as possible. OPTEVFOR did require that the 
officers manning the combat system for IOT&E be Surface Line 
Officers. The Officer in Charge and the Assistant for 
Operations were originally 





be the officers 
they are both 
Engineering Duty Officers with extensive experience in 
combat systems and were disqualified by OPTEVFOR. 
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b. Insure manning priority is high enough that 
personnel transfers are not effected at inopportune times. 
The personnel that will demonstrate the system 
for IOT&E must be onboard long enough to develop a working 
knowledge of the system and to have been integrated into the 
operational team. 
To have a vholescale turnover of personnel after 
the completion of DT&E but prior to IOT&E would be 
disastrous but it is not unheard of. The author experienced 
such a phenomenon on a major combatant after the completion 
of refresher training and prior to deployment. 
c. Site Officers should have training in contract 
administration. 
The FFG CSLBTS was constructed on the 
contractor's property. Additionally, the contractor was 
responsible 
specifically 
of the CSLBTS 
for combat system integration. Though not 
charged with contract administration the staff 
basis 
for 
had to work with the contractor on a daily 
that the site would be their responsibility 
IOT&E and future phases of the LBTS. 
knowing 
the DT&E, 
Therefore it makes sense that the LBTS staff should have 
knowledge of what was and was not required of the 
con tractor. 
Paragraph IV.B of DODD 5000.3 provides a definition 
of DT&E and states that one of the objectives of DT&E is to, 
" demonstrate that the engineering design and 
development Frocess is complete •••• " 
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The Defense Science Board Task Force on Test and 
Evaluation found a serious difference in the attitude 
between the development of computer software and the 
development of the hardware. They found there was no 
standard · procedure within OSD for orderly testing of 
software items. As a result the Task Force provided 
guidelines to ensure that software development is scheduled, 
performed, and tested with the same degree of attention to 
quality, schedule, and cost as is the hardware of the 
system. 
a. Contractor/Navy integration tests do not stress 
the system like Navy free play does. 
Integration tests and computer software debugging 
procedures are of a controlled nature where a specific 
action is initiated and then the system response is observed 
to see if the desired reaction occurs. With a complex 
combat system with several analog to digital and digital to 
digital interfaces it is just not possible to define all the 
possible specific actions. 
In setting up an AAW i'ntegration test or a 
debugging procedure, logic dictates that a button being 
punched in sonar control should not have an impact on the 
results of the test. But in complex systems actions in 
areas that should have no bearing on the reaction often do 
affect the results. Free play can show these type of 
problems. Additionally, free play will show that a system 
can respond in a totally undesirable way if actions are 
performed out of sequence. 
Compounding the technical complexities of 
integrating and debugging the computer software for a combat 
system is an organizational interface problem. The Fleet 
combat Direction System Support Activity (FCDSSA) is tasked 
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to provide maintenance and update of command and control 
digital progiams. FCDSSA reports directly to OPNAV. The 
other digital programs in the combat system are within the 
purview of the Material Command. NMARC provided in 
Recommendation T&E-19: 
The FCDSSAs should remain under the control of OPNAV 
hut improved procedures and processes, within a formal 
framework, should be established for the Material 
command's interface with the FCDSSAs. 
Because the FCDSSAs are external to the Material 
Command a positive effort must be made to insure that they 







the combat system. Also, the FCDSSAs must 
programs for which they have responsibility. 
checkout they will require the support of the 
combat system which is controlled by 
representatives of the Material Command. To minimize any 
friction it is necessary to ensure that all parties 
concerned understand the working relationships that are 
required to successfully debug all the software of a complex 
combat system. 
rest of the 
b. Attempt to arrange for non-standard aircraft 
services. 
It is important to recognize that there are 
places other than the service squadrons from which aircraft 
services can be obtained. Reserve squadrons are one area 
worthy of liason in looking for aircraft services. Test 
flights for repair facilities is another. 
Equally important to recognize is that jet 
services are not always required. This is particularily 
true during development and integration testing where time 
on station is often more important than aircraft speed. 
This reccgnition opens additional avenues such as local 
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avaition enthusiasts. 
Paragraph IV.B.3 of DODD 5000.3 requires of DT&E 
during the Full-Scale Development phase and prior to the 
first major production decision that: 
•••• the DT&E accomplished shall be adequate to 
insure: that engineering is reasonably complete; that all 
significant design problems (including compatibility( 
interoperability, reliability, maintainability, ana 
logistical considerations} have been identified; and that 
solutions to the above problems are in hand. 
Paragraph IV.C of DODD 5000.3 requires of OT&E during 
Full-Scale Development: 
•••• OT&E will be accomplished to assist in evaluating 
operational effectiveness and suitability (including 
compatibility interoperability, reliability, 
maintainabilify, and logistic and training requirements. 
Paragraph IV.C also requires that: 
OT&E will be accomplished by operational and support 
personnel of the type and qualifications of those expected 
to use and maintain the system when deployed •••• 
With this OT&E personnel requirement in mind a close 
comparison of the requirements of DT&E and OT&E during 
Full-Scale Development reveals some significant differences. 
The requirements in the areas of maintainability, 
documentation, and logistics are different during DT&E and 
OT&E. 
a. Insure that sailors can maintain all equipment at 
the site. 
Personnel resources will be available for the 
major subsystems but not necessarily for the 




normally would fall in the domain of the electricians, the 
interior communication technicians, and the electronic 
technicians. On the ship there would be enough equipment to 
justify the personnel but at a site which onl.y represents 
part of a ship it may not be the the most effective use of 
resources to assign say an electrician just to maintain one 
piece of equipment. But to meet the intent of the test and 
evaluation directives this equipment should be maintained by 
fleet personnel. This is particularily true if the 
equipment is new or subjected to a maintenance philosophy 
that is different from prior usage. The equipments and 
subsystems do undergo a separate test and evaluation . but the 
manning philosophy, operating schedule, or repair philosophy 
that they are tested to may not be consistent with the 
requirements of the combat system represented by the LBTS. 
Therefor some cross rate training may be necessary such as 
training a fire control technician to maintain a radar 
repeater which is normally the responsibility of an 
electronics technician. 
In order that the sailors can perform the 
required maintenance the necessary documentation must . be 
available. This includes equipment · and system technical 
manuals, Ordnance Pamphlets (OP), Ordnance Data (OD) , 
Preventative Maintenance System (PMS) Maintenance 
Requirement cards (MRC) and Corrective Maintenance Cards 
(CMC), Electronics Information Bulletins (EIB), etc., as 
applicable f cr the equipment and subsystems installed at the 
site. Additionally, tool sets, including special purpose 
tools, and test equipment are also required. 
b. Make the contractor run PMS according to the Navy 
system while the system is the contractors responsibility. 
Normally the contractor that builds the equipment 
also is tasked to write the PMS documentation. If the 
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contractor builds the equipment and writes the PMS test 
documentation he should be able to fit the two together 
either by correcting the equipment or by correcting the PMS. 
Additionally, in assembling and checking out a complex 
combat system not all equipment will be ready 
simultaneously. Those that are ready first must be 
maintained until the others are ready and then all must be 
maintained until the larger system is successfully 
integrated. Presumably the contractor would turn the system 
over to the Navy after demonstration of integration. Part 
of the demonstration should be the common contractor/Navy 
base of PMS. 
c. PMS takes a back seat during DT&E and IOT&E. 
Because of the resources external to the site 
required to conduct DT&E and IOT&E these periods tend to be 
very concentrated as far as demands on site personnel is 
concerned. They are operating the system for this test or 
that scenario essentially all the time and the only 
maintenance performed is corrective. 
The same thing happens aboard ship during 
underway or refresher training when there are long periods 
of General Quarters which demands all equipment and all 
personnel. 
If the site had the personnel resources to treat 
the DT&E and IOT&E on a Condition III basis the PMS could be 
kept current as it is aboard ship during extended periods of 
condition III. But to provide the personnel resources at a 
LBTS to allow a Condition III type environment during the 
short periods of DT&E and IOT&E is an extravagance that can 
not be afforded. Therefore to maintain any kind of PMS 
schedule it is necessary to schedule and perform those PMS 





IOT&E periods. Those PMS tests with periodicities that 
require performance during DT&E and IOT&E must be done 
the middle of the night at the expense cf crew rest and 
morale. 
d. Obtain tactical publications, standard Navy 
signs, posters, operating instructions, etc. 
Paragraph IV.C of DODD 5000.3 requires that, 





evaluating operational effectiveness and 
n and further requires, "OT&E •••• will be 
in as realistic an operational environment as 
To support the IOT&E so that the operational 
effectiveness can be evaluated it is necessary to have 
operational type documentation that would not be required 
for development and systems integration. The documentation 
includes tactical publications, warfare publications, and 
communication codes. Additionally, a supply of expendables 
like DRT paper, PMPs, colored pencils, grease pencils, 
maneuvering board paper, etc., are necessary to support 
testing of the man-machine system. 
One criticism of using a LBTS to conduct an 
evaluation of a shipboard system is the lack of realism of 
the test site. Missing are ships motion and the stress of 
being at sea for extended periods of time. However, the 
addition 0£ standard signs, 
etc., to these spaces that 
ships specifications will 
posters, operating instructions, 
already been built to the actual 
add to the realism of the 
environment 
evaluation. 
surrounding the crew during the test and 
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e. Insure HAVSHIP tech manuals and ship and general 
specifications are available. 
The officers and sailors assigned to the LETS do 
not have contract administration responsibility but they 
will be at the site throughout its construction. While 
there they will be observing the contractors performance and 
it makes things run much smoother if the Navy personnel can 
check the reguirements if they observe something that is 
different from the way they remember it was on their last 
ship. 
f. Insure that secure storage for publications is 
available. 
There should be storage available even at a 
development site but the volume of secure storage will have 
to be significantly greater at a site that includes OT&E as 
a mission. 
• 
g. Pattern contractor supply procedures along Navy 
supply line. 
Part of OT&E is operational suitability which 
includes logistic requirements. 
Some of the equipments and subsystems in a new 
complex combat system will not yet be in the Navy inventory 
and as such will not be supported by the Navy supply system 
but rather by the building contractor. To provide a 
reference for logistic comparisions and to also prevent the 
LBTS crew from having to learn several different supply 
procedures standardize the supply systems of all the 




This chapter has presented the lessons learned at the FFG 
CSLBTS as they relate to the policies of test and evaluation 
that evolved during the growth of the PFG program. The 
lessons learned show the impact of the requirement for 
operational test and evaluation. Operational test and 
evaluation places requirements on the site that are 
different than the requirements of development test and 
evaluation and system integration. The differences are 
evident in the areas of configuration of the LB~S, personnel 
training and manning, testing, maintenance, documentation, 
and logistics. 
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policy being issued to correct the problem, and then the 
policy being implemented and followed by a Military Service. 
If one can believe that the Guided Missile Frigate is a 
representative program within the Navy then it can be said 
that operational test and evaluation has arrived. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF LAND-BASED TEST SITES 
Chapter III has shovn the impact on the CSLBTS as the 
objectives of the site changed from the original of 
development and system integration to meeting the objectives 
of IOT&B. Decision coordinating Paper 97 of 24 March 1975 
in section IV.B.2.b identifies further objectives of the 
CSLBTS: 
•••• With respect to technical adequacy of GFE, all 
computer and display equipments and peripherals will be 
checked out completely at the combat System Land Based 
Test Site prior to delivery to the building yards to 
ensure they are operating properly and are fully ready for 
installation aboard ship ••••.••• the Navy will proviae up 
to five Combat srstem Integration specialists per yard to 
assist the fol ow yards in checking out and testing the 
combat system. These contractor personnel will have had 
first-hand experience at the combat System Land Test Site 
to qualify them for this task. 
These objectives will be added to the already imposed 
objectives of proofing the documentation and the maintenance 
test package which started after the completion of IOT&E. 
Also the CSLBTS will be used to evaluate change proposals 
prior to application to the ships throughout the life of the 
FFG program. Additionally, the author has heard mention of 
using the site to train the crews of the lead and follow 
ships prior to their reporting to the ships. Appendix B 
shows a sequence of the specific objectives of a Combat 
System Land-Eased Test Site. 
The conclusion of the author is that the range of 
possible objectives fer a CSLBTS has not been adequately 
explored. Based on the impact of a demonstrated shift in 
the objectives it appears that this exploration should 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR POTHER CONSIDERATION - - -- -- -- -..... ---
A. GENERAL 
This thesis has traced the major studies called for by 
both the executive and legislative branches of the 
government to investigate the acquisition of weapons 
systems. One common problem area in all of the studies was 
test and evaluation. This thesis has also followed the 
implementing directives in the area of test and evaluation 
that resulted from or were influenced by the studies. The 
implementing directives and instructions are very explicit 
in the requirement for operational test and evaluation prior 
to the major production decision in the systems acquisition 
process. 
The Guided !issile Prigate program grew from the 
conceptual stage through the major production decision 
during the period that the studies were being conducted and 
the directives were being promulgated. A Combat System 
Land-Based Test Site was constructed as part of the Guided 
aissile Frigate program. This thesis then examined the 
lessons learned at the CSLBTS as the lessons learned relate 
to the implementing directives. The most prominent of the 
lessons learned was the observation of the shift in 
objectives of the CSLBTS from development and system 
integration to meeting the requirements of Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation. The shift in objectives of 
the LBTS from development and system integration to 
operational test and evaluation affects the configuration of 
the land-based test site, personnel training and manning, 
testing, maintenance, documentation, and logistics. 
The import of this is that this is a prime example of a 
problem being identified within the Department of Defense, a 
53 
receive a high priority at the beginning of any new ship 
acquisiticn Frogram. 
C. LESSONS L!ARNED 
The lessons learned presented in this thesis were divided 
into the categories of configuration of the LBTS, personnel 
training and manning, testing, maintenance, documentation, 
and logistics. The recognition of the requirement for 
operational test and evaluation had an effect in all of 
these areas. 
The degree of realism required to make a valid assessment 
of how well personnel are supported by the system to become 
an effective weapon is much greater than that required for 
development and system integration. This means more actual 
equipments and fewer dummies or mockups. Associated with 
the demand for more actual equipment to support the 
operational test and evaluation are the supporting elements 
such as tactical and warfare publications, communication 
codes, status boards, etc. 
Operational test and evaluation must not only assess 
effectiveness of the weapon system but also suitability 
which includes maint~nance, reliability, compatibility, and 
logistic and training requirements. Additionally, the 
operational testing must be performed by operational and 
support personnel of the type and qualifications of those 
expected to use and maintain the system vhen 
assessment of suitability demands 
documentation, and logistic support that is 









test and evaluation suitability 
elements are maintenance 
documentation, maintenance procedures, and logistic 
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procedures. The CSLBTS staff must ensure that all the 
supporting elements are available at the LBTS prior to IOT&E 
much like a ship's crew must ensure the necessary support 
elements are onboard prior to deployment. 
The conclusion cf the author is that the preparations 
necessary at a land-based test site to satisfy the 
requirements of operational test and evaluation is not 
unlike the task required of the commissioning crew of a new 
ship. 
D. AREAS POR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
Two land-based test sites were established as a part of 
the Guided Missile Frigate program. The Combat System 
Land-Eased Test Site is at a contractors facility. The 
Propulsion system Land-Based Test Site is at a government 
facility. Worthy of investigation is a comparison of the 
flexibility, responsiveness, adaptability, and cost cf the 
two sites throughout the lives of the sites. This would 
include construction, development, system integration, 
development test, operational test, documentation proofing, 
crew training, and system change verification. What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of the LBTS being at a 
contractor facility or government facility throughout the 
life of the test site? What are the ramifications if the 
government facility is a training command and the site is to 
be their responsibility after documentation validation is 
complete? 
The later stages of the ship construction period is 
rather hectic. There is constant friction between the 
industrial activities such as pipe lagging, ventilation duct 
installations, painting, etc., and the checkout of the 
combat system. The use of the Combat System Land-Based Test 
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site removes much of the combat system effort that was 
previously required aboard ship during ship construction of 
a new class of ships. The equipment interface problems and 
system integration problems should have all been resolved at 
the CSLBTS. All that remains to be performed aboard ship 
during the ccnstruction period is sufficient testing to 
prove that the shipyard did the installation correctly. Will 
the reduced ~equirement in the combat system area allow 
scheduling the checkout separately from the terminal 
industrial activities? Or will the filings from the sheet 
metal ~ork still be getting into the combat system equipment 
and the comtat system testers still be blotting the new 
paint job? 
This thesis has been restricted to the lessons learned at 
the Combat System Land-Based Test Site. A similar effort at 
the Propulsion system Land-Based Test Site and a comparison 
of the results could provide some valid generalizations 
regarding land-based testing. Additionally, a top down look 
at the two land-based test sites from the project managers 
office would be worthwhile. 
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January 19, 1973 
NUMBER 5000. 3 
DDR&E 
Department of Defense Directive 
Test and Evaluation 
DoD Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense 
Systems," July 13, 1971 
DepSecDef multi-addressee memorandum, "Conduct of 
Operational Test and Eva.J..uation," February 11, 1971 
(hereby cao.cell.ed) 
DepSecDef multi-addressee memorandum on the subject 
of the role of DDR&E in test and evaluation as 
related to the DCP System, April 21, 1971 (hereby 
cancelled) 
DepSecDef multi-addressee memorandum., "Test and 
Evaluation in the System Acquisition Process," 
Augnst 3, 1971 (hereby cancelled) 
This Directive establishes policy for the conduct of test 
and evaluation by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "DoD Comnonents") 
in the acquisition of defense systems (Sections III through 
VI). In addition, it codifies the responsibilities of the 
Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Test 
and Evaluation (DD(T&E)), which were previously promulgated 
by references (b), (c), and (d)(SectionVII). 
II. CANCELLATIONS 
References (b), (c), and (d) are hereby superseded and 
cancelled. 
III. scom AND APPLICABILITY 
The provisions of this Directive encompass major programs 
of defense systems acquisition as designated by the Secretary 
of Defense (described in Section II., of reference (a)) and 
apply to all DoD Components that are responsible for such 
programs. In addition, it provides principles to be applied · 
by the Do~ Components in their acquisition of Defense Systems 
that do not fall in the "major acquisition programs" category. 
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DI. POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES 
A. General. 
1. Test and evaluation shall be commenced as early as 
possible· and conducted throughout the system acq)lisition 
process as necessary to assist in progressively reducing 
acquisition risks and in assessing military worth. 
2. Acquisition schedules will. be based, inter alia, upon 
accomplishing test and evaluation milestones prior to the 
time that key decisions which would comm.it significant 
added resources a.re to be made. 
3. -
4. 
Before the initiation of development of a new system, test 
and evaluation using existing systems, or modifications 
thereto, may be appropriate to help define the military need 
for the proposed new system and to estimate its military 
utility; Determination of military worth, need, and utility 
will be accomplished in accordance with other DoD directives. 
All. test and evaluation activities shall consider environ-
mental issues and provide assessments for review as early 
as possible in the test planning cycle. (See DoD Directive 
6050.1.) 
B. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E). DT&E is that test and 
evaluation conducted.to: demonstrate that the engineering design 
and development process is complete; demonstrate that the design 
risks have been minimized; demonstrate that the system will meet 
specifications; and estimate the system's military utility when 
introduced. DT&E is planned, conducted, and monitored, by the 
developing agency of the DoD Component, and the results thereof 
are reported by that agency to the responsible Military Service 
Chief or Defense Agency Director. 
1. DT&E shall be started as early in the development cycle as 
possible and include testing of component(s), subsystem(s), 
and prototype or preproduction model(s) of the entire 
system. Compatibility and interoperability with existing 
or planned equipments and systems shall be tested. 
2. During the development phase following the Program Initiation 
Decision (Milestone I), adequate DT&E shall be accomplished 
to demonstrate that technical risks have been identified_ 
and that solutions are in hand. 
3. During the Full-Scale Development phase and prior to the 
first major production decision, the DT&E accomplished 
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sba:ll. be adequate to insure: that engineering is reasonably 
complete; that all significant design problems (including 
compatibility, interoperability, reliability, maintainability, 
and logistical considerations) have been identi£ied; and that 
solutions to the above problems are in hand. 
4. For those systems which have a natural interface with equipment 
of another Component or may be acquired by two or more Components, 
joint DT&E may be required. Such joint testing will include 
participation and support by all affected Components as 
appropriate. 
"C. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). OT&E is that test and 
evaluation conducted to estimate the prospective system's military 
utility, operational effectiveness, and operational suitability 
(including compatibility, interoperability, reliability, maintain-
ability, and logistic and training requirements), and need for any 
modifications. In addition, OT&E provides information on organi-
zation, personnel requirements, doctrine, and tactics. Also it 
may provide data to support or verify material in operating instruc-
tions, publications, and handbooks. OT&E will be a~complished by 
operational and support personnel of the type and qualifications of 
those expected to use and maintain the system when deployed, and 
will be conducted in as realistic an operational environment as 
possible. OT&E will normally be conducted in phases, each keyed to 
an appropriate decision point. During Full-Scale Development OT&E 
will be accomplished to assist in evaluating operational effective-
ness and suitability (including compatibility, interoperability, 
reliability, maintainability, and logistic and training requirements). 
OT&E will be continued as necessary during and after the production 
period to refine these estimates, to evaluate changes, and to re-
evaluate the system to insure that it continues to meet operational 
needs and retains its effectiveness in a new environment ·or against 
a new threat. 
1. In each DoD Component there will be one major field agency 
(or a limited number of such major field agencies) separate 
and distinct from the developing/procuring command which will 
be responsible for OT&E and which will: 
a. Report the results of its independent test and evaluation 
directly to the Military Service Chief or Defense Agency 
Director. 
· b. Recommend directly to its Military Service Chief or 
Defense Agency Director the accomplishment of adequate 
OT&E. 
c. Insure that the OT&E is effectively planned and conducted. 
60 
2. In addition, each DoD Component will provide within its 
immediate headquarters staff a :f'ul.1-time, strong, focal point 
organization to assist the independent OT&E field agency and 
to keep its Military Service Chief or Defense Agency Director 
f'ully informed a.s to needs and accomplishments. 
3. Operational testing should be separate from development testing. 
However, development testing a.nd early phases of operational 
testing may be combined where separation would cause delay 
involving uc.a.cceptable military risk, or would cause an unac-
ceptable increase in the acquisition cost of the system. When 
combined testing is conducted, the necessary test conditions 
and test data required by both the DoD Component developing 
agency a.nd OT&E agency must be realized. In addition, the 
separate Component OT&E,agency must: insure that the combined 
test is so planned a.nd executed as to provide the necessary 
operational test information; participate actively in the test; 
and provide separate evaluation of the resultant operationat 
test information. 
4. Acquisition programs will be so structured that at least a.n 
initial phase of operational test a.nd evaluation (IOT&E) will 
be accomplished prior to the first major production decision 
adequate to provide a valid estimate of expected system opera-
tional effectiveness a.nd suitability (including compatibility, 
interoperability, reliability, maintainability, a.nd logistic 
and training requirements). Pilot production items will be 
employed for IOT&E wherever practicable. Prototypes, if they 
are reasonably representative of the expected production items, 
may be employed, where there otherwise would be delay involving 
unacceptable military risk or unacceptable increased acqui-
sition costs. 
5. For more complex systems, additional phases of OT&E may be 
required and performed with pilot or preproduction it~s 
subsequent to the first major production decision but prior to 
the availability of first production items. When production 
items are available in sufficient quantity, follow-on phases 
of OT&E adequate to meet the full objective outlined above 
will be accomplished by the appropriate DoD Component's inde-
pendent OT&E agency. 
6. For those systems which have a natural interface with equip-
ment of another Component, or may be acquired by two or more 
Components, joint OT&E will be conducted where required. Such 
joint testing will include participation a.nd support by all 
affected Components as appropriate. 
D. Test and Evaluation for Major Ships of a Class. The long design, 
engineering, and construction period of a major ship will normally 
preclude completion of the lead ship a.nd accomplishment of test 
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thereon prior to decision to proceed with follow ships. In lieu 
·thereof, successive phases of' DT&E and OT&E will be accomplished 
as early as practicable at test installations and on the lead 
ship so as to rapidly reduce risks and thereby minimize the need 
tor modification to follow ships. 
i. When aomba.t system compl.exi ty warrants, there will be constructed 
a combat system test installation wherein the weapon, sensor, 
and information processing subsystems a.re integrated through 
their interfaces in the ma.Ile.er expected in the ship class. 
Adequate initial DT&E and OT&E of' the integration of' those sub-
systems will be accomplished thereon prior to the first major 
- production decision on follow ships. To the degree practicable 
first generation subsystems will have been approved for service 
use prior to the. initiation of integrated operational testing. 
Where subsystems cannot be service approved prior to the initial 
operational testing, their integration will be tested at the 
test-site installation as early as possible in their acquisition 
cycle., 
2.. For new ship types incorporating major technical advancements 
not earlier proven in hull or non-nuclear propulsion design, 
a prototype incorporating these advancements will be employed • 
. If the major technological advancements are contemplated in 
only some features of the hull or non-nuclear propulsion design, 
the test installation need incorporate only the applicable new 
:features. Adequate test and evaluation on such prototype will 
be completed prior to the first major production decision on 
:follow ships. 
3. The prototyping of Navy nuclear propulsion plants will be 
accomplished in accordance with the methods in use by the 
Atomic Energy Commission. Construction of the lead· and f'ollow 
ships will be done in the sequence now being used. 
4. For all new ship classes, continuing phases of' OT&E on the 
lead ship will be conducted at sea as early in the acquisition 
· process as possible for specified systems or equipments and, 
if required, full ship operational evaluation to the degree 
feasible. 
5., A description of the subsystems to be included in any test 
site er test prototype, the schedules to accomplish test and 
evalua.tion,and any exceptions to the above policies will be 
set forth in the initial and any subsequent DCPs and approved 
by the Secretary of Defense. 
E. Test and Evaluation for One-of-a-Kind Systems. For one-of-a-kind 
systems, or systems involving procurement of only a very few over 
an extended period, the principles of DT&:E of component(s) 2 subsystem(s) 
l 6 2 
. ···w 
and prototype or first- production ~odel(s) of the entire .system 
will be applied. Compatibility and interoperability with existing 
or planned equipnents will be tested. OT&E will be conducted as 
earl.y as possib.le by the OT&E agency as necessary to .provide a 
valid estimation of operational suitability and effectiveness. 
F. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E). PAT&E is test 
and evaluation of production items to demonstrate that the items 
procured f'ul.f'ill the reqtiirements and specifications of the procuring . 
contract or agreements. It is the responsibility of each DoD Com.ponent 
to accomplish tbe necessary PAT&E throughout the production phase of 
the acquisition process. · , ·· .. -
G. Integrated T&E Plans. The DoD Component will prepare as early as 
possible in the acquisition process, and prior to initiation of 
Ful.l.-Sca.le Development, an overall test and evaluation. plan to 
identify and integrate the effort and schedules of all T&E to be 
accomplished and to insure that all necessary T&E is accomplished 
prior to the key decision points. This plan will be kept current 
by the DoD Component. 
H. Defense S stems Acauisition Review Council DSA:RC 
Cance t Paner :CCP Procedures for Ma"or Defense S 
ent 
1. The DCP prepared for use a.t the time of' the Program Initiation 
Decision (Milestone I) for a ma.jar Defense System .will identify 
the critical questicns and areas of risk to be resolved by test 
and evaluation. It will also provide a summary statement of 
test objectives, schedules, and milestones. The DSARC in its 
review will determine the adequacy of the statement of questions 
and issues and of test objectives and schedules. 
2. When the DoD 9omponent proposes to .initiate Full-Scale Develop-
ment the revised DCP will give the results of T&E accomplished 
to that date, an updated statement of critical questions and 
areas of risk still needing test to resolve, and a detailed 
statement of test plans and milestones. The DSARC will assess 
and carment to the Secretary of Defense as to the adequacy of 
T&E progress and of planned T&E to occur prior to the first 
major production decision. 
3. The DSARC in its review prior to the first major production 
decision will. assess and comment to the Secretary of Defense 
as to the. adequacy of test results to support a decision to 
proceed with major production and the adequacy of plans and 
schedu.les for any remaining testillg·.-
4. In: case of DCP revisions a.nd DSARC reviews subsequent to the 





Jan 19, 73 
5000.3 
results and plans and schedules for additional. test and 
evaiuation will. be presented. 
V. WAIVERS 
-
A. In the case of major programs, a.c:y wa.i ver of the accomplish-
.· : ment of the T&E ·as outlined in the approved :OOP will be 
·· · granted only by the Secretary of Defense. · 
B. Por other than major programs, the DoD Components will. designate 
the minimum threshold tor definition of less than major 
programs. For such programs the waiver of the required T&E 
will: 
l.. Within the Military Departments, be granted only· by the 
Secretary, the Under Secretary, or such Assistant 
Secretary as the Secretary may designate. 
2. Within the Department of Defense Agencies, be granted 
only by the Director. 
VI. EXCLUSIONS 
VII. 
Test and evaluation of nuclear weapons subsystems which are governed 
by other joint DoD/AEC agreements are excluded from the foregoing 
provisions ot this directive. 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DERJTY DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND. 
ENGINEERING, TEST AND EVALUATION (DD(T&E)) 
The DD{T&E) has across-the-board responsibility for OSD in test 
and evaluation matters. This responsi~ility includes: 
A. Reviewing test and evalua~ion policy and procedures applicable 
to the Department of Defense as a whole and recommending 
changes he believes appropriate directly to the Secretary of 
Defense. 
B. Monitoring closely the test and evaluation planned and conducted 
by the DoD Components for major acquisition programs and for 
such other programs as he believes necessary. 
c. Assisting in the preparation of, and/or reviewing, -the Test 
and Evaluation Sections of DCPs and Program Memoranda (l?Ms). 
D. For major programs, reporting to the DSARC and the Worldwide 
Mi.J.itary Command and Control System Council as appropriate, 
· and directly to the Secretary of Defense for such programs, 
at each major milestone decision point his assessment as to 
t~ adequacy of the identified critical issues and questions 
to be resolved by test and evaluation, test plans and sched-
ules, and the adequacy of .the accomplished T&E to justi.t'y the 






E. Monitoring closely such joint testing as is accomplished by 
the DoD Components in connection with their planned acquisition 
of speci.fic systems. In addition, initiating and coordinating 
the accomplishment of such additional joint testing as is 
necessary, with specific delegation to an appropriate Component 
(or Components) of alJ. practical aspects of the joint test. 
F. Coordinating a.nd reviewing the test and evaluation of foreign 
systems for possible DoD use. 
· G. Fulfilling OSD responsibilities for the National and major 
Service test facilities. -H. Monitoring, only to the extent required to determine the 
applicability of results to weapon system acquisition or 
modification, that test and evaluation: 
1. Directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which relates to 
the Single Integrated Operations+ Plan (SIOP) operational 
!"actors. 
2. Conducted primarily for development or investigation of 
organizational or doctrinal concepts. 
To accomplish these duties, statements of critical issues for 
DCPs/PMs, test plans for their resolution, and test results will 
be made available to DD(T&E) · at his request as early as developed. 
VIII. REPORTING REG,UIREMENTS 
The reporting requirements prescribed herein are exempt from formal. 
approval and control in accordance with III.D.3~, of DoD Directive 
5000.19. 
IX. EFFECTIVE DATE AND D1PLEMENTATION 
This Directive is effective immediately. Each DoD Component which 
has authority and responsibilities under reference (a) will imple-
ment this Directive within 60 days and will forward three copies 
of each implementing document to the Director of Defense Research 
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